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CHOICES, DOGMATISMS AND BETS 
– JUSTIFYING PEIRCE’S REALISM
Escolhas, Dogmatismos E apostas 
– JustificanDo o REalismo DE pEiRcE
Ivo A. Ibri*
ABSTRACT  – The conceptual axis of this paper is a reflection on Charles 
Peirce’s realism, trying to show it as the ground from which many others 
of his philosophical doctrines are derived. In its first part, the paper 
analyses the problems posed by the classical Peircean paper Questions 
Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man, proposing to extract 
from the consequences of this analysis the guidelines of a realism 
that gradually become more radical in Peirce’s mature work. Such 
consequences will be consolidated in his Phenomenology, a science that 
will ground Semiotics and a conception of symmetry related to Peirce’s 
categories. This symmetry regarding his epistemology and ontology 
will be, by the way, omnipresent in all Peircean philosophical system. 
The second part of the paper discusses the concepts of mediation and 
representation, also under a realistic background, concluding that these 
concepts cannot be coherently interlaced in nominalistic philosophies, 
in which is often found theoretical consequences somehow committed 
with dogmatic and no dialogic postures, in the sense of a meaning 
analysis proposed by the classical Peircean pragmatism.
KEYWORDS – Realism. Dogmatism. Semiotic dialogue. Mediation. Repre- 
sentation. 
RESUMO – O eixo conceitual deste artigo constitui-se em uma reflexão 
sobre o realismo de Charles Peirce, buscando mostrá-lo como a base da 
qual se derivam muitas outras de suas doutrinas filosóficas. Na primeira 
parte do artigo, são analisados os problemas colocados pelo clássico 
ensaio peirciano Questões referentes a certas faculdades reivindicadas 
pelo homem, propondo extrair das consequências dessa análise as 
diretrizes de um realismo que gradualmente se torna mais radical na 
obra madura de Peirce. Tais consequências serão consolidadas em 
sua fenomenologia, uma ciência que fundamentará a semiótica e uma 
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concepção de simetria relacionada às categorias do autor. Essa simetria 
associada à sua epistemologia e ontologia será, a propósito, onipresente 
em todo o sistema filosófico peirciano. Na segunda parte do artigo, 
são discutidos os conceitos de mediação e representação, também 
sob um viés realista, concluindo que esses conceitos não podem 
ser coerentemente relacionados nas filosofias nominalistas. Nessas 
filosofias, encontram-se frequentemente consequências de alguma 
forma comprometidas com posturas dogmáticas e não dialógicas, se 
confrontadas com uma análise do significado tal como proposto pelo 
pragmatismo clássico peirciano.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Realismo. Dogmatismo. Diálogo semiótico. Mediação. 
Representação.
1  The Path of Peirce’s Thought on Realism
Still in his youth, when he was 29 years old in 1868, Peirce wrote two 
articles entitled Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man1 
and Some Consequences of Four Incapacities2, both related and sequential, 
basically addressing epistemological guidelines that characterized his 
subsequent philosophy. To my mind, these two texts blend harmoniously 
with Peirce’s realistic stance, which has always permeated his thought. 
Notwithstanding his self-criticism for nominalistic slips in the beginning 
of his philosophical career, when he made use of a language yielding to 
the psychology vocabulary, which he would later eschew, I hold that the 
roots and implications of realism were already present in his work, even 
in his most premature formulation. The subsequent development of his 
realism occurred through an enhancement of logical resources, same as 
the proposition of the theory of continuity (synechism) and logic caused 
the notion of continuum to replace that of the universal, resulting in his 
conception of the major scholastic question on the reality of the generals, 
in this shape: Are any continua real?3
Let’s remember the following questions, very well known by Peircean 
scholars: 
a)  We have no power of introspection, save that all knowledge of the 
internal world derives from our knowledge of external facts;
b) We have no power of intuition, other than all cognition is logically 
determined by previous cognitions;
c)  We have no power to think without signs;
d)  We have no conception whatsoever of the absolutely incognizable.
1 CP-5.213-263.
2 CP-5.264-317.
3  NEM-IV, p. 343. I.  A. Ibri – Choices, dogmatisms and bets
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Peirce re-analyses these four propositions from their origin in the essay 
“Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man”, where he 
characterizes his strong anti-Cartesian position, outlined by the refusal 
of the beginning of a philosophy through a universal doubt, by the 
proposition of an intuition with cognitive power, and by the substantial 
separation of spirit and matter.
It must be borne in mind, yet again, that Peirce’s mature work offers 
a theoretical framework enriched not only with logic, as, for example, his 
existential graphs with which he grounded an iconic logic, but also, and 
mainly, with regard to a solid ontology, based on his Phenomenology and 
his Semiotics. This allows for a rereading of the abovementioned ‘four 
incapacities’ in light of a new vocabulary, resulting from the definitive 
and vigorous introduction of an idea of world that, if never absent from 
his philosophy even in his youthful work, it definitely entered his final 
theoretical system, differentiating the author from lines of epistemological 
reflection grounded solely on an analysis of language or of the faculties 
of a cognizant subject.
There are grounds to say that Peirce’s mature philosophy is definitely 
dialoguing, semiotically interacting between the worlds of the real object 
and the signs, which seek to represent it, and that of the evolutionary 
theory of the interpretations of those representations. The conceptual 
axis of this philosophy is outlined in the extensive consideration of his 
three categories that, arising from an inventory of the ways in which we 
experience phenomena, conclude that they are also ways of reality. This 
amplification of the scope of the categories, permeating both subject 
and world, conveys a relation of fundamental formal symmetry for the 
justification of the dialogue between language and experience.
One may ask whether the introduction of the theory of world that 
ultimately interacts with Peircean epistemology would not be an undue 
inflationary measure, when the contemporary philosophical trend has 
evolved in the opposite direction, i.e., toward deflation, particularly when 
some ontology would seem to emerge interactively with variables of a 
cognitive nature.
Indeed, Peirce’s mature philosophy, by starting with a Phenomenology, 
already introduces the subject into the world, and this man-world 
cohabitation would never be undone throughout the entire development 
of the other theories. Such man-world cohabitation will imply – in an 
understanding that considers Peirce’s realism – the establishment of 
a correlation between both, which will be guaranteed by the validity, 
likewise, of the categories to the ways of being of the consciousness 
that experiences and the ways of being of the reality experienced. This 
categorial symmetry between subject and world becomes the pivot of I.  A. Ibri – Choices, dogmatisms and bets
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the understanding of Semiotics as a dialoguing science between the 
universes of sign and object.
What enables us to say ‘we learn from experience’ in Peirce’s 
philosophy’ is not at all a concession to coarse empiricism, whose 
philosophical incompetence extends from an epistemological naivety 
to a nominalistic skepticism, namely, grounded on the possibility of a 
discontinuity of Nature without, however, reflecting on the resulting 
radical discontinuity of the possibility of any language prior to any 
cognition. Learning from experience will, first of all, require the logical 
justification of its possibility. Here, the symmetry of the categories will 
show its efficiency, by validating a substantial connaturality between the 
object of experience and the experiencing mind. This connaturality will 
ultimately be the stage where the semiotic dialogue becomes possible 
– not, it should be emphasized, merely intersubjective, but between 
subjectivity and objectivity, both represented as realms of signs and 
meaning in Peirce’s mature philosophy. The semiotic dialogue between 
sign and object, between language and reality, will be provided, as 
mentioned, by a connaturality between both, consummated in Peirce’s 
doctrine of Objective Idealism, namely, an acknowledgment that both, 
object and sign, are substantially ideality.
The adoption of a categorial symmetry will also provide a reading of 
the world in a non-anthropocentric way: correlates of human faculties 
will always be found in Nature, a theoretical aspect that, to those 
unfamiliar with Peirce’s philosophy, would perhaps be most amazing, 
even disturbing. In the short space of this essay, however, I cannot 
explore a detailed justification of the consequences of Peirce’s refusal of 
an anthropocentric philosophy.
From these introductory comments it seems interesting to analyze 
the aspects of the aforementioned ‘four incapacities’. Let us begin by the 
first, that “we do not have any power of introspection, other than that 
all knowledge of internal world derives from our knowledge of external 
facts”.
This explicitly marks the mature approach of the author to this theme. 
Peirce refuses to appeal to psychology to reflect on the phenomenon 
of introspection. Indeed, his view of the theme will here focus on the 
interaction of the categories and on pragmatism. To say that knowledge 
of the external world is what determines knowledge of the internal 
world, is to say that our interiority is merely of a potential nature or 
modally possible, and only concrete action can determine the internal 
indetermination as an effective choice. On the other hand, action, as 
part of an objective history, opens itself cognitively to public experience, 
reflexively providing its semiotic, dialogic, analysis. To lack the power I.  A. Ibri – Choices, dogmatisms and bets
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of introspection also means not ‘knowing what we know’ of us and of 
‘other minds,’ other than by the way how such knowledge reflects in the 
external world, appearing in a defined fashion – and, if we were also to 
avail ourselves of Heidegger’s vocabulary, notwithstanding its usual lack 
of clarity, we would say that the external world is that which, effectively, 
reveals itself as a phenomenon in its cognitive determination. In a 
categorial manner, the external world is characterized by secondness, the 
locus of the type of experience that offers itself to the visit of interpretative 
minds. The hypothesis of connaturality between fact and thought seems 
necessary to justify that the absorption of the former into the latter is 
done in a semiotic and dialogical manner.
It is in the external universe that that the possibility of knowledge 
over other minds is consummated: we have no access to internal worlds, 
unless they manifest themselves through some external side, in such a 
way that they are, thus, semiotically foreshadowed.
In turn, its second incapacity, according to which “we have no 
power of intuition other than all cognition is logically determined 
by previous cognitions,” is clearly an anti-Cartesian statement, as 
commented before. Indeed, to Peirce, all cognition is built within a 
temporal continuum, in which there is a logical interlacing between the 
signs, and the mind that operates these relations has no power to act 
simultaneously in the universe of mediation and in intuitive immediacy 
, as if intending, contradictorily, to be in time and concomitantly out 
of it. However, a deeper analysis of Peircean epistemology will lead to 
the question of the synthesis proposed by Kant: what is the condition 
for the possibility of a unity of consciousness, that is, the unity under 
which signs are cognitively associated? While, in order to justify 
such unity, Kant reverts to the Cartesian I think, Peirce holds that the 
unity of consciousness is immediate feeling, defined by him as quale-
consciousness. A kind of immediacy of a non time as foundation turns into 
the possibility of synthesis or apprenticeship that only develops in time. 
No doubt, this is a complex enough theme, allowing for a mere reference 
here, albeit very interesting for an investigation on epistemological 
heuristics.
Let us now turn to the third incapacity: ‘We have no power to think 
without signs’. In a way, its consideration derives from the previous 
analysis of the second incapacity. All thought occurs in signs, namely, in 
logical representations, in a continuously temporal process in which past 
memory is always active for the recognition and insertion of phenomena 
in conceptual signs that analyze a state of things present for some future 
prediction. In this simple description, time is evidenced as fundamental 
for thought. In addition, to think an object is to think the predicates that I.  A. Ibri – Choices, dogmatisms and bets
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define its conduct, and conduct can only be apprehended through signs 
that represent relations between phenomenal states.
The fourth and last incapacity states that ‘we have no conception 
whatsoever of the absolutely incognizable’. Being incognizable, according 
to Peirce, is being unable to possess known predicates, meaning that 
such an object does not appear from its external side, empowering itself 
as phenomenon. Up to this point, this analysis is no less than Kantian. 
However, in light of Peirce’s categories, anything that does not manifest 
itself as external phenomenon, open to the general universe of experience, 
simply does not exist, not passing from a state of internal indetermination 
to a state of external determination, namely, from a potential state to an 
actual state. Incognizableness, then, occurs from the non-existence of 
the object, transferring the problem from the sphere of epistemology to 
that of ontology.
In this brief rereading of a text of the young Peirce, it can be said that 
there is a common trait between those incapacities, namely, they all relate 
to the presupposition that our cognition always occurs realistically. It 
develops from the need of a world that is a stage for the characterization of 
signs in an exteriorization that defines them, that takes them out of a state 
of concealment to one of exposure, enabling a community of investigation. 
This is the ground of Peirce’s pragmatism seen in the light of a realistic 
ontology, providing the possibility of a semiotic dialogue between internal 
and external worlds, without a significant estrangement between them. 
This non-estrangement justifies a doctrine such as objective idealism, 
insofar as it claims there is no substantial dichotomy between external 
and internal worlds, making a semiotic dialogue between them feasible.
2  Representation and Mediation under a Realistic Approach4
Questions that might be interesting to the connections between 
Peirce’s semiotics and the realistic approach of his philosophy are as 
follows: “Are processes of mediation also processes of representation?” Or 
under an alternative form: “Is representation a specific form of mediation?” 
Since I suppose this distinction between mediation and representation is 
considered pivotal to a philosophy of a realistic approach such as Peirce’s, 
it seems interesting to reflect on what has been understood by both terms, 
in order to better understand such conceptual distinction. One important 
point to highlight is to bring into light some recent postures concerning   
 
4  I owe the inspiration for the second part of this paper to Vincent Colapietro [see 
Colapietro (2010)], with whom I could discuss the subject ‘mediation and representation’ 
in Peirce. I.  A. Ibri – Choices, dogmatisms and bets
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what representation is and the criticism from some so-called anti-
representationist schools. Consider, for instance, Richard Rorty’s concept 
of representation5 as an exact mirror of some object, an old-fashioned 
Enlightenment view that holds, according to him, an unjustifiable hope 
for catching up the essence of reality. Besides this way of conceptualizing 
representation, there are also other anti-representationist theories, which 
considered that representation is something that creates a sort of distance 
between man and phenomenon in itself, and then our apprehension of a 
true sensitive world would be impossible and blocked by it. Beginning 
with this last view of representation, it is clear to Peircean scholars that 
firstness is the proper mode of being to a straight experience of world, 
an experience of presentness where time always implied in conceptual 
signs are absent. However, to admit such an experience will not imply a 
rejection of an experience where men’s mind looks to the world through 
any kind of mediation. Rationality cannot be developed without signs, 
as well stated by Peirce in his youth. Both experiences, mediated and 
immediate are considered as such in Peirce’s philosophy, as we all well 
know.
On the other hand, Rorty’s concept of representation is quite 
unsuitable not only to Peirce’s philosophy, but also to the contemporary 
conception of positive theories in general. The latter are, at least among 
the most epistemologically updated fields of knowledge, straightly 
linked with an indeterminist view of the world. At this point, it’s 
interesting to remember that Peirce’s fallibilism, on one hand, and the 
distinction between immediate and dynamical object, on the other, are 
enough to refuse such view of representation as an exact mirror of any 
reality.
With these preliminaries, it seems worth asking if it would not be 
possible to conciliate representation and mediation within Peirce’s 
philosophy, under a typical thirdness vocabulary? This conciliation, I 
suppose, would require the understanding of representation as the way 
through which mediation acts or is somehow efficient. Now, is it important 
to reflect on what it is to mediate? Is not mediation a kind of processing 
media between two opposites with the explicit function of conciliating 
one conduct to the other? Is not Thirdness, ultimately, this processing 
medium that incorporates secondness in it, breaking its character of 
brute force by reasonably representing the habitual way it acts? Here, 
incidentally, I used the word representing as the way through which 
the conduct of the otherness can be simulated; to simulate, here, would   
 
5  Cf. RORTY, Richard. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1979. I.  A. Ibri – Choices, dogmatisms and bets
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mean to predict future conduct. If we take the relationship between man   
and reality, two interactive beings, we could say that our knowledge 
of any real object is the way we represent its future behavior. If this 
representation is true, namely, if we can efficiently simulate the way 
this object acts, in other words, its laws, then we are able to predict its 
conduct and so we also can plan our own conduct before it. According to 
this line of thought, a true representation will allow an efficient mediation 
where every sort of conflict potentially might be reduced to intelligibility 
and future reasonableness. To act between requires truly representing 
the opposite poles, breaking down their opposition by finding a common 
way in which both can act together.
Additionally, let me propose the following question: if mediation 
can dispense with representation, as an alternative to it, then we could 
imagine some situation where mediation is feasible but not necessarily by 
means of a true representation. Would not this case be a sort of mediation 
without the true knowledge of the otherness, i.e., without incorporating 
secondness in thirdness, which would violate the character of thirdness 
as thirdness? Let’s remember that in the history of ideas we can find 
schools like the Sophists, to whom language was only an exercise of pure 
rhetoric, an instrument of seduction that worked as mediation among 
the Greeks for a long historical period. There wasn’t any truth in their 
speeches, mainly because they were skeptics who didn’t believe on the 
possibility of anything true.
To support this line of argument, I suppose it may be helpful to bring 
into reflection Peirce’s well known essay The Fixation of Belief. Besides 
the dialogical scientific method for fixing beliefs, three others are there 
presented, namely, tenacity, authority and a priori. Are not the latter three 
mediations? Aren’t they ways in which men’s conduct can be ruled? 
Could we say that any of them involves inquiry in a Peircean sense and, 
therefore, knowledge? All scholars who are certainly very familiar with 
this Peircean paper would say no. The evident reason is that in all three 
cases, we could say that secondness brutality would be kept latent, being 
dominated by force or dogmatically. Regarding the dogmatic way to fix 
belief, we could call, for example, the historical period of the middle ages, 
where all mediation to understand Nature were constituted by ‘saving 
appearances’, a sort of allowed rationality which had  no relation with 
truth because all natural processes were governed by God’s will. To save 
appearances were mediation without any character of representation, 
in this case.
Aren’t these three cases good examples of mediation without 
representation? Is it not the case of scientific method for fixing beliefs the 
only one where both representation and mediation would work together? I.  A. Ibri – Choices, dogmatisms and bets
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Maybe it would be useful, in order to support this line of reasoning, to 
cite Peirce’s work passages where representation and mediation seem 
to be tightly connected. They could be exemplified by:
Category the Third is the Idea of that which is such as it is a being a 
Third, or Medium, between a Second and its First. That is to say, it is 
Representation as an element of the phenomenon6 [Further] Thirdness 
is nothing but the character of an object which embodies Betweeness 
or Mediation in its simplest and most rudimentary form; and I use it 
as the name of that element of the phenomenon which is predominant 
wherever Mediation is predominant, and which reaches its fullness in 
Representation7; [and] Thirdness, as I use the term, is only a synonym 
for Representation…8.
It is not without reason that Peirce affirms, in the very definition of 
sign, its character of representation of the object, for which it is necessary 
that there is the possibility of a phenomenic experience capable, in a 
continuum, of feeding the also continuous flow of interpretants. It is also 
worth noting that this is the reason why Phenomenology is a science that 
is presupposed as the support of Semiotics.
Thus, scientific method must be semiotically dialogical with the 
object, with the goal of representing it truthfully. Only in this case it 
seems legitimate to say that mediations are representations. However, 
it is interesting to see that mediations without representations, namely, 
those that do not take into account a phenomenology of the object 
to be conceived, nor a semiotic process of construction of logical 
interpretants, can, nevertheless, affect conduct, as required by the 
main criterion of pragmatic meaning. In this case, once again, the 
realistic presupposition seems vital to distinguish actions governed by 
dogmatisms, whether tenacious, authoritarian or transcendent (a priori), 
from others that are in a permanent semiotic dialogue with experience. 
Realism presupposes systems of real thirdness, whose reference in factual 
secondness follows a semiotic path of particular replicas of general 
signs, namely sinsigns that point to legisigns. The representation of 
these legisigns is what enables the construction of scientific theories, 
insofar as they clearly hold a dialogue with experience. For no other 
reason, Peirce acknowledges that the search for truth through continuous 
investigation, that is, through the application of a method of inference 
phenomenologically sustained, was the only effectively genuine form of 
 
6  CP- 5.66.
7  CP-5.104.
8  CP-5.105.I.  A. Ibri – Choices, dogmatisms and bets
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scientificity9. The other constituting forms of mediation fail by moving 
in the direction of some particular interest, distant from a careful and 
impartial observation of phenomena. Thus, one may suppose that Peirce’s 
reasons to sustain this position were that such mediations would not 
be representations with the power of predicting the conduct of objects, 
since they did not fulfill the requirements for a thirdness in the light of 
a realism, that is, a realism that ultimately sustains the undifferentiated 
substantiation of the categories, both for semiosis operations and for the 
reality of those objects.
3  Conclusion
In the title of this work I endeavored to reflect on the possibility of 
a pragmatism that advocates the meaning of a concept as the set of 
its practical consequences, considered as presuppositions of realistic 
and nominalistic philosophies. Realistic approaches can be authorized 
to make choices, insofar as their mediations are representations of the 
conduct of the object, implying that rationality may fulfill its role of 
simulating what could occur with phenomena, in an attempt to present 
them divested of brute force, an expression that Peirce reserved for a 
secondness as yet unrepresented, that is, still not reducible to thought. 
On the other hand, resorting to Peirce’s classification in his essay The 
Fixation of Belief, dogmatic mediations would be those that sustain 
beliefs through tenacity, authority or a priori. All of these could not, truly, 
influence conducts that take into account the observation of objects, 
having, in some way, to obstruct or obscure the reality of phenomena, 
so as to assert a set of interests that would stipulate ways of action, 
whether individual or collective.
Finally, I would briefly mention philosophies similarly nominalist 
that presuppose a totally accidental reality of phenomena, namely, 
totally dependent on some order that would be imposed by a language 
that provides meaning to reality, since any arrangement of the facts 
that preceded such human constitution of possible meaning would 
be an inexplicable essentialization of the world and an intolerable 
occurrence of an undesirable metaphysics.  Now, since the predicate 
of otherness is, supposedly, the major trait of what can be called real, 
given by Peirce through the category of secondness, then the course of 
facts would be independent of any mediation that purportedly wishes   
 
9  On this theme, see Ivo A. Ibri, “Reflections on Practical Otherness: Peirce and Applied 
Sciences”, Ideas in Action – Proceedings of the Applying Peirce Conference, Helsinki: 
Nordic Studies in Pragmatism, 2010, p. 74-85.I.  A. Ibri – Choices, dogmatisms and bets
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to provide meaning and, in fact, would ultimately fail in any mission 
of representation that it may intend to fulfill. Genuinely, in terms of 
pragmatism, a philosophy that does not acknowledge some form of real 
thirdness, even on an approximate, evolutionary and incomplete basis 
as in Peirce, could not make choices, even if recognizing in them some 
inevitable existential source of anguish. In the face of a world without real 
order the only thing to do is make bets on the future course of phenomena, 
where the brutality of facts would only be overcome by luck, however 
contingent this game could be. Evidently, such a philosophy has a lot in 
common with a tenacious, authoritarian or transcendent dogmatism for 
disregarding the conduct of phenomena as the true referential method 
of their representation.
In short, we could say that Peirce’s realism is nothing more than an in-
depth presupposition that makes logically consistent all claims for dealing 
with the otherness of the world through mediations that are genuine 
representations of an order, which is proper and intrinsic to phenomena.
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